CompTIA SecurityX Practice Test (CAS-005)

Local event logs provide detailed visibility into process launches, user actions, and error messages on the workstation. These logs are essential for identifying unauthorized software execution. Network-based data or external intelligence may provide broader context but lacks the precision and depth found in host-based logging.

A standard hardware interface that steps through instructions and retrieves data from on-chip registers refers to Joint Test Action Group (JTAG). JTAG uses boundary scanning for hardware-level debugging, so it can access protected memory locations and detect hidden instructions. A universal debugging cable over a general-purpose port and a hidden administrator function rely on higher-level access, which does not guarantee consistent low-level visibility. Emulating the processor architecture with software does not provide the same direct circuit-level interaction for memory inspection.

Applying cryptographic validation with a non-rewritable archival system ensures that any unauthorized modification to stored records is visible and effectively blocked. Regular backups do not guarantee proof of original content integrity. Network restrictions help block external threats but do not validate stored data. Enhanced authentication guards against unauthorized entry but does not confirm data remains unchanged post-login.

SOC 2 is widely recognized in external reviews for verifying categories like security and confidentiality. It is designed to provide an attestation of established practices, which fosters trust. A code scanner or overhead checklist may be useful internally but lacks recognized third-party validation. A resource from a cloud alliance helps guide basic implementations but does not typically provide formal attestation.

An inline mechanism monitors the flow between source and destination and actively disrupts unsafe connections. By blocking suspicious behavior as it occurs, harmful data never reaches protected servers. A device that only provides notifications or looks at logs later does not stop attacks in progress. A firewall that quarantines all traffic could cause severe delays and hamper normal data exchange. A detection device that does not interrupt questionable activity leaves a gap in protection.

Automated compliance engines that continuously compare each system against a centrally defined baseline immediately detect drift, eliminate many manual checks, and can generate audit-ready reports on demand. Manual spot checks, user self-reporting, or reducing logging either leave large gaps in coverage or actively undermine audit evidence, so they do not satisfy the stated goals.

Message encryption and signing with unique certificate pairs assigned to each user achieves confidentiality through public key encryption and verifies authenticity through digital signatures. Domain-based record methods do not provide message-level encryption or a direct signature from individuals, symmetrical session keys lack a reliable mechanism to verify sender identity, and transport-level encryption protects only the data path without offering user-specific authentication.

The correct factor is Attack Vector. This metric accounts for the method by which an attacker deploys or triggers the exploit, such as over a network or through local physical access. The other metrics serve different purposes. Privileges Required measures credential levels needed during or after the exploit, Scope measures authorization impacts that extend beyond the original boundaries, and Confidentiality Impact measures how data privacy is affected. Attack Vector is most relevant to how the exploit itself is delivered.

Using safe string-handling libraries or methods that enforce boundary checks ensures data does not exceed allocated memory. Other approaches do not directly address memory boundaries. Enabling multi-factor authentication adds an extra login layer but does not stop data from being written outside assigned buffers. Increasing hashing strength helps protect stored data but does not defend the function in question. Configuring an allow list for domain-based restrictions does not solve the memory overwrite risk.

Establishing an unbroken line of secure communication from user devices to the final system ensures that data remains protected even when passing through multiple nodes. Terminating and re-establishing secure connections at edge servers can introduce points of exposure. Location-based routing simplifies access, and cryptographic checksums support file integrity, but neither alone guarantees data confidentiality during transit.

This approach is known as attestations, where accounts and their permissions are periodically reviewed to uphold business standards. Reviewing user eligibility at designated intervals keeps privileges aligned with the principle of least privilege. Setting up a second identity provider relates to federation, which does not enforce scheduled reviews. Confirming extended user privileges with a token focuses on short-term authorization rather than routine validation. Combining SSO with device posture checks addresses session security but does not involve structured reviews of permissions.

A well-structured method outlines each breach phase according to recognized markers of malicious activity. Mapping the identified phases enables investigators to classify repeated adversarial patterns in an organized framework. Gathering data through honeynets can reveal more attacker behaviors, but does not confirm classifiable patterns across the entire event chain. Searching logs for blocked connections detects certain attempts but overlooks full phase alignment. Host-based oversight can pinpoint potential threats, yet it does not ensure alignment with recognized phases when assembling a complete picture of an attack.

Continuing to rely on an outdated application creates a pattern of superficial fixes instead of fully solving root causes. This allows gaps to keep returning. A rolling vulnerability schedule, mandated inspections, and gathering advisories help identify and address issues before they reoccur. Repetitive reliance on old functionality makes the same weaknesses surface again and again.

The most effective step is to execute the file in a sandbox for dynamic analysis. Since static analysis was hindered by heavy obfuscation, running the executable in a controlled, isolated environment allows the analyst to observe its actual behaviors, such as network connections, file system modifications, or registry changes, which would otherwise remain hidden. Submitting the hash is a good initial step, but it is ineffective for unknown or polymorphic malware. Performing a full disassembly is extremely time-consuming and complex for heavily obfuscated code. Relying on standard event logs is insufficient, as the malware may not have executed or could be designed to evade standard logging mechanisms.

A decoy server that appears to be a critical resource attracts scans or exploitation attempts from an insider. This provides clear evidence of unauthorized probes targeted at that environment. Reviewing internal logs can be valuable but might not reveal an insider's advanced tactics if commands merge with legitimate traffic. Monitoring external domain records concentrates on outside activity. Subscribing to a threat intelligence feed is useful for external threats but does not specifically detect unusual internal host probing